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1. Introduction 
Eligibility for a free lunch was recently extended to all state school children in England and 
Scotland who are in Year 2 or below (i.e. up to age 6 or 7). For all other state school pupils 
in the UK, eligibility remains restricted by a means test so that free school meals (FSMs) go 
to a relatively narrow set of children in poor households. Around 1 million children 
currently receive means-tested FSMs: equivalent to 15% of those who are not entitled to 
universal FSMs.1 We estimate that around two-thirds of those children are in the lowest-
income fifth of households with children.  
A change to the rules governing entitlement to FSMs is now taking place, due to the 
introduction of universal credit (UC): one of the most radical changes to the working-age 
benefit system in several decades, which will integrate six existing means-tested benefits – 
housing benefit, income support (IS), child tax credit (CTC), working tax credit (WTC), 
income-based jobseeker’s allowance (JSA), and income-based employment and support 
allowance (ESA) – into a single payment. This will have major impacts on the cash incomes 
and incentives of different families, analysed in detail elsewhere.2 But, from the beginning, 
this reform also raised the question of how eligibility for FSMs will be determined. This is 
because, under the ‘legacy’ system that UC replaces, children are simply ‘passported’ to 
FSMs if their families are receiving IS or income-related JSA or ESA, or if they receive 
maximum CTC and do not receive WTC. When these no longer exist as distinct benefits, an 
alternative method of assessing entitlement to FSMs is required. This inevitably involves 
either the government spending more on the provision of FSMs or some families losing 
eligibility, or some combination of both.  
The government has delayed making this tricky decision for some time, simply extending 
entitlement to FSMs to all school children in families receiving UC as an interim measure in 
the early stages of its roll-out. It has now provided the long-awaited confirmation of how 
entitlements will work under UC, from this month (April 2018). It has said that it expects a 
net increase of around 50,000 children receiving FSMs in 2021–22 under UC, relative to the 
number that would have received them under the system that UC replaces.3  But it has 
provided no further information on, for example, who will gain entitlement and who will 
lose entitlement. The analysis in this briefing note is intended to help understand better 
the effects of the plans. 
 
 
1  Department for Education, ‘Schools, pupils, and their characteristics: January 2017’, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-characteristics-january-2017; Scottish 
Government, ‘School meals and PE supplementary data, 2017’, 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/School-Education/MealsSD/mealspesd; StatsWales, ‘Pupils 
eligible for free school meals by local authority, region and year’, 
https://statswales.gov.wales/Catalogue/Education-and-Skills/Schools-and-Teachers/Schools-Census/Pupil-
Level-Annual-School-Census/Provision-of-Meals-and-Milk/pupilseligibleforfreeschoolmeals-by-
localauthorityregion-year; Northern Ireland Department of Education, ‘School meals – 2016/17 statistical 
bulletin’, https://www.education-ni.gov.uk/publications/school-meals-201617-statistical-bulletin-11-april-2017. 
2  See J. Browne, A. Hood and R. Joyce, ‘The (changing) effects of universal credit’, in C. Emmerson, P. Johnson 
and R. Joyce (eds), The IFS Green Budget: February 2016, https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8136. 
3  Department for Education, Eligibility for Free School Meals, the Early Years Pupil Premium and the Free Early 
Education Entitlement for Two-Year-Olds under Universal Credit: Government Consultation Response, 2018, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/692644/Government_respon
se_FSM_and_EY_entitlements_under_Universal_Credit.pdf. 
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2. Eligibility for FSMs under UC 
The government has said that it will offer FSMs to families in receipt of UC who have 
annual net earnings (i.e. after income tax and employee National Insurance) of £7,400 or 
less. All state school children in England and Scotland in Year 2 or below will continue to 
be entitled to FSMs, with no means test.  
The government has also stated that the £7,400 threshold will be fixed in cash terms until 
the end of the UC roll-out period – which it assumes to be the end of 2021–22 – after which 
the threshold will be reviewed. Between the point at which the new threshold is 
introduced (2018–19) and then (2021–22), the Office for Budget Responsibility expects 
prices (as measured by the CPI) to rise by 6%, nominal average earnings to increase by 8% 
and the National Living Wage (NLW) by 11%4 – meaning that, as we show later, 
considerably fewer families will be entitled than if the threshold had increased in line with 
inflation or with average earnings. This new £7,400 threshold joins a growing list of 
parameters that have been introduced into the tax and benefit system and whose value 
has not subsequently been indexed to anything economically meaningful (such as prices 
or earnings) – an unfortunate habit. 
The government has also announced a number of transitional protections to ensure that 
current recipients of FSMs do not immediately lose their entitlement.5 The analysis in this 
briefing note ignores this, focusing on the long-run implications of the plans, after 
transitional protections have expired. 
Removing eligibility for all means-tested FSMs once earnings exceed £7,400 creates a ‘cliff-
edge’: families receiving FSMs will be worse off if their earnings increase from just below 
to just above this level. This cliff-edge also occurred under the passporting criteria for 
FSMs of the legacy system. It also occurred under the interim arrangements in the early 
stages of UC rollout whereby all UC recipients were eligible for FSMs – at the point where 
the last pound of UC entitlement was exhausted, FSM eligibility was removed too. Relative 
to those arrangements, the newly announced plan simply moves the cliff-edge further 
down the family earnings distribution. It would not be straightforward to avoid such a 
cliff-edge under any system for means-testing FSMs.  
 
 
4  Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and Fiscal Outlook: March 2018, http://obr.uk/efo/economic-fiscal-
outlook-march-2018/. 
5  For details of the transitional protections, see Department for Education, Eligibility for Free School Meals, the 
Early Years Pupil Premium and the Free Early Education Entitlement for Two-Year-Olds under Universal Credit: 
Government Consultation Response, 2018, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/692644/Government_respon
se_FSM_and_EY_entitlements_under_Universal_Credit.pdf. 
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3. Who gets FSMs? Comparing the 
legacy and UC systems 
For this analysis, we use data from the Family Resources Survey, an annual survey of the 
incomes and circumstances of around 20,000 UK households per year. We pool data from 
financial years 2013–14, 2014–15 and 2015–16, giving us a sample of 18,000 households 
with children. We calculate entitlements to FSMs under both the legacy and UC systems 
using the IFS tax and benefit microsimulator, TAXBEN.6 We simulate entitlements as they 
will be in 2021–22 – the last year for which the government has confirmed its plan to retain 
the £7,400 threshold in nominal terms. Our analysis accounts for the fact that families’ 
earnings (and particularly those on the NLW) will increase between now and 2021–22, 
pushing some of them above the fixed £7,400 threshold. As we shall see, this is important. 
If the threshold were uprated more slowly than earnings growth beyond 2021–22 as well, 
the number of children entitled would fall after that (all else equal). We simulate the 
number of families entitled to FSMs, ignoring whether or not they take up their 
entitlement. Later we discuss how many might actually claim them. 
Which types of families gain and lose from this way of means-testing FSMs? To 
understand some of the patterns, it is useful to remember that under the current system 
it is generally only possible for lone parents to be entitled if they in paid work for 15 hours 
a week or fewer, and for couples to be entitled if they are in paid work (combined) for 23 
hours a week or fewer. This is because if they work more than that they are entitled to 
working tax credit, which makes them ineligible for FSMs. In contrast, under UC, 
entitlement is only dependent upon family net earnings being below the £7,400 threshold 
(irrespective of hours worked). That means that, in general, families working more hours 
at a lower hourly wage are more likely to be eligible for FSMs under UC than under the 
legacy system, and vice versa for lower-hours, higher-earning families. For example: 
 A lone parent working 12 hours a week at £12 per hour would be entitled to FSMs under 
the legacy system, because they could receive maximum child tax credit – a passporting 
benefit – and would not qualify for working tax credit (as they work too few hours a 
week). But they would not be entitled to FSMs under the UC system as their earnings 
would be too high (£7,488 per year).  
 A lone parent working 18 hours a week at £7.83 per hour (the NLW) would not be 
entitled to FSMs under the legacy system, because they would be entitled to working 
tax credit. But they would be entitled to FSMs under the UC system, as their earnings (at 
£7,329 per year) would be below the threshold. 
The wider context of the UC reform is worth bearing in mind here. Under the legacy 
system, WTC becomes payable once families work 16 hours (for lone parents) or 24 hours 
(for couples) per week, and is then gradually withdrawn as earnings rise further. Because 
UC will abolish these hours-based premiums, families working just enough hours to be 
entitled to WTC will tend to do especially badly out of the move to UC in terms of their 
cash benefit entitlement. The fact they are relatively likely to gain FSM entitlement is linked 
closely to the fact that they will lose cash entitlements, since it is their eligibility for WTC 
 
 
6  For a brief description of TAXBEN, see T. Waters, ‘TAXBEN: the IFS tax and benefit microsimulation model’, 
2017, https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/12858. 
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under the current system which makes them ineligible for FSMs. Conversely, some 
families in ‘mini-jobs’ who do not work enough hours to qualify for WTC will do relatively 
well out of UC in terms of their cash entitlement, whilst being relatively likely to lose 
eligibility for FSMs. For an analysis of winners and losers from the wider UC reform, see 
Browne et al. (2016).7 
Figure 1 shows our estimates of the number of children entitled to FSMs, under the legacy 
system and under UC. Overall, we estimate that the UC system will result in around 50,000 
(4%) more children being entitled to FSMs than would have been the case under the 
legacy system. This means our analysis produces very similar results to those produced by 
government modellers, although the government figure also incorporates a small 
additional effect from increased take-up of UC (as discussed later).  
However, that net change of around 50,000 is the result of considerably larger offsetting 
numbers of winners and losers. We estimate that around 160,000 children (13% of those 
entitled under the legacy system) will lose entitlement under a UC system, while about 
210,000 (equivalent to 16% of the number entitled under the legacy system) stand to gain 
entitlement for FSMs under UC.8 
Figure 1. Estimated number of children entitled to means-tested free school meals, 
under legacy system and UC, in the long run 
 
Note: A child is defined as entitled to means-tested FSMs if: they are not entitled to universal FSMs, they live in a 
family that is entitled to at least one passporting benefit, and (under the UC system) the family’s earnings are 
below the net earnings threshold.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using Family Resources Survey, 2013–14, 2014–15 and 2015–16, and TAXBEN, the IFS 
microsimulation model. 
 
 
7  J. Browne, A. Hood and R. Joyce, ‘The (changing) effects of universal credit’, in C. Emmerson, P. Johnson and R. 
Joyce (eds), The IFS Green Budget: February 2016, https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8136. 
8  As the Children’s Society has pointed out, more than a million fewer children would be eligible for FSMs under 
the proposed UC system than if the transitional arrangements (whereby all UC recipients were entitled) had 
persisted (see Children’s Society, ‘Free school meals and universal credit: briefing on government’s proposed 
changes to eligibility criteria for free school meals’, 2018, 
https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/sites/default/files/free-school-meals-universal-credit-briefing-15-jan-
2018-final.pdf) – although the government had never indicated that this was its long-term plan, and it would 
have more than doubled the number entitled relative to the legacy system. 
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Figure 2. Net change in entitlement to means-tested free school meals from moving 
to UC system, by parental hours worked 
 
Note: See Figure 1. ‘Lower hours’ is defined as working 1–15 hours per week for a single person or 1–23 for a 
couple. ‘Higher hours’ is defined as working 16+ hours for a single person or 24+ for a couple. Net change in 
entitlement given as a percentage of children who are school age and not eligible for universal FSMs, and who 
live in a family entitled to legacy benefits. 
Source: See Figure 1. 
The decision to fix the £7,400 threshold until 2021–22 has a significant impact in reducing 
the generosity of the FSM regime under UC. If the government uprated the threshold in 
line with average earnings or CPI between 2018–19 and 2021–22, rather than 50,000 more 
children being entitled to FSMs under the UC system, UC would increase the number of 
children entitled to FSMs in 2021–22 by 140,000 or 120,000 respectively, rather than the 
50,000 increase implied by the current plan. This also serves to highlight the significance 
of whether or not the government chooses to uprate the £7,400 threshold beyond 2021–
22. If it does not, the FSM regime under UC would eventually give fewer children an 
entitlement than the legacy system would have done. 
Figure 2 splits our results by employment type and hours worked. This illustrates two 
main points: 
 Children living with at least one parent in paid work gain, on average, from the new way 
of assessing FSM eligibility under UC. The number of such children eligible will be about 
140,000 higher under UC than under the system it replaces. Contrastingly, about 90,000 
children in workless families will lose eligibility for FSMs. This is largely because their 
parents have unearned income or assets which disqualify them from UC (but did not 
disqualify them from all legacy benefits). 
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 As explained above, however, within the group of working families there are both 
winners and losers. Those working enough hours to be entitled to working tax credit 
and hence ineligible for FSMs (the ‘higher hours’ group) can gain from the new way of 
assessing eligibility. Meanwhile, those working fewer hours than that are likely to lose – 
and in fact, as the right-hand axis of the figure shows, proportionally those losses are 
very substantial. About 40% of children on legacy benefits in the ‘lower hours’ group 
(and about half of those entitled to FSMs under the legacy system) would lose 
entitlement to FSMs under UC. 
Again it is useful to set this alongside the wider impacts of the UC reform on cash benefit 
entitlements. In some respects the changes to FSM eligibility reinforce those wider 
impacts, and in other respects they counteract them. The workless families who lose 
eligibility for FSMs under UC largely do so precisely because they will not be eligible for UC 
at all in light of assets or unearned income, which UC treats more harshly than the legacy 
system. In other words, they both lose cash benefit entitlements and FSM entitlements. 
However, as explained at the start of this section, among working families without 
unearned income or significant financial assets there is a tendency for the relative winners 
and losers in terms of FSM entitlements to be opposite to the relative winners and losers 
in terms of cash benefit entitlements. 
The impacts also differ by family type. The children of lone parents actually account for all 
of the net increase in FSM eligibility under UC: we estimate that around 60,000 more of 
them will be entitled to FSMs in 2021–22 than would have been the case under the legacy 
system (though again there are winners and losers among the children of both lone 
parents and couple parents). This difference can be partly explained by the fact that 
couple families are relatively likely to be in the ‘lower hours’ group (which, for them, 
means working fewer than 24 hours per week) and yet still be earning over £7,400. As 
stated above, all families in such circumstances will lose their FSM entitlements under UC. 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of children entitled to FSMs across the income distribution, 
and how that proportion changes as a result of the introduction of UC. Unsurprisingly, the 
share of children who are entitled to FSMs under either system decreases sharply as you 
move up the income distribution. The net effect of the policy is to increase the share of 
children in the poorest fifth of households who are entitled by about 2 percentage points. 
The net change in the other deciles is relatively small. The higher net proportion of 
winners in the bottom quintile is roughly in proportion to the higher proportion of 
entitlements that go to those families in the first place: in other words, under UC, the 
proportion of means-tested FSMs going to the bottom quintile will be approximately 
unchanged (at 65%). Notably, under both the UC system and the legacy system it replaces, 
fewer than half of the children in the lowest income quintile will be entitled to FSMs. 
Thus far, we have focused our analysis on the entitlement to FSMs. However, some 
children will not receive FSMs even though they are entitled to them – either because their 
parents do not claim passporting benefits to which they are entitled or because they do 
not register for FSMs despite claiming a passporting benefit. Changing ‘take-up’ rates 
could affect overall receipt, even if there were no change in entitlement. It is plausible that 
UC will increase receipt of FSMs over and above its effect on entitlement. UC makes it 
impossible to claim just some (cash) benefits to which one is entitled and not others (since 
it is a single integrated benefit). As a result, it is likely that the move to UC will result in an 
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increase in benefit take-up. That may in turn affect the number claiming FSMs. For 
example, a family that is entitled to housing benefit and child tax credit, but only claims  
Figure 3. Percentage of children entitled to means-tested free school meals under 
legacy system and UC, by net income quintile among households with children 
 
Note: This figure gives the number gaining, losing or maintaining entitlement as a percentage of all school-age 
children who are not entitled to universal FSMs. Incomes are measured after taxes and benefits, under the 
assumption of full take-up of benefits. Position in the income distribution is measured relative to all households 
with children. 
Source: See Figure 1. 
the former, would not be able to claim FSMs under the current system, as they do not 
claim a passporting benefit. But when they are transitioned to UC, they would be able to 
claim FSMs so long as their earnings are under the threshold. This increase in benefit 
take-up may result in a small increase in FSM receipt. If we look at FSM receipt, rather than 
entitlement, and account for a plausible increase in benefit take-up, we estimate around 
70,000 extra children will receive FSMs under UC than under the legacy system.9 This is a 
similar result to that produced by the government, who estimated that the policy would 
lead to an additional 50,000 children in receipt of FSMs.10 It is of course receipts, rather 
 
 
9  In this analysis, we assume that families will claim UC if and only if they claim a benefit that is to be replaced 
by UC. We also assume that, conditional on claiming a passporting benefit, 89% of them will register for FSMs. 
This is in line with Department for Education research – see A. Lord, J. Easby and H. Evans, Pupils Not Claiming 
Free School Meals – 2013, Department for Education Research Report RR319, 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/266339/DFE-RR319.pdf. 
10  Department for Education, Eligibility for Free School Meals, the Early Years Pupil Premium and the Free Early 
Education Entitlement for Two-Year-Olds under Universal Credit: Government Consultation Response, 2018, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/692644/Government_respon
se_FSM_and_EY_entitlements_under_Universal_Credit.pdf. 
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than entitlements, which determine the cost to government of providing free school 
meals. These figures imply that FSMs will cost around £20-30 million more to the 
Exchequer in 2021–21 than would have been the case under the legacy system (a fiscally 
negligible impact).11 
 
 
11  Assuming a cost per meal of £2.30, as suggested by Department for Education, UIFSM: guide for local 
authorities and schools. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/universal-infant-free-school-meals-guide-for-schools-
and-local-authorities#revenue-funding-allocations. 
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4. Conclusion 
In summary, the government’s plans for FSMs under universal credit are likely to result in 
a small increase of around 50,000 in the number of children eligible for FSMs. Fiscally the 
cost of this small increase in generosity is negligible, at around £20-30 million per year. 
Looking more closely at the effects, though, there are both winners and losers and 
different groups do differently.  
UC will not materially change how focused FSM entitlements are on the lowest-income 
families. But it will result in a significant reprofiling of those entitlements. It will tilt 
entitlements away from families where no parent is in paid work and towards families 
with at least one parent in paid work. The lost entitlements among workless families are 
largely driven by the small minority of them whose unearned income or assets disqualify 
them from UC altogether (hence, they will lose both cash benefit entitlements and FSM 
entitlements). Within working families, there are winners and losers too, however: 
entitlements will be tilted towards families working more hours on lower hourly wages 
and away from families where the parents work low numbers of hours on a higher wage. 
This actually partly offsets the pattern of relative winners and losers from the wider UC 
reform, in terms of cash benefit entitlements. There are also differences by family 
structure: in fact, the net increase in eligibility is entirely accounted for by the children of 
lone parents. 
One important factor behind our results is the government’s decision to freeze the £7,400 
eligibility threshold under UC until 2021–22. Had it uprated this threshold in line with 
earnings or CPI, approximately an additional 100,000 or 80,000 children respectively would 
be entitled to FSMs once UC is fully rolled out than under the current plan. This highlights 
the significance of whether the government chooses to begin uprating the threshold after 
2021–22. 
